The Washington Naval Agreement

It took place in the Memorial Continental Hall in central Washington[3] and resulted in three major contracts: the Four Power Contract, the Five Powers Treaty (better known as the Washington Navy Treaty), the Nine Powers Treaty, and a series of minor agreements. These treaties retained peace in the 1920s, but were not renewed in the increasingly hostile world of the Great Depression. Article XIX of the treaty also prohibited the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States from building new fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. Existing fortifications in Singapore, the Philippines and Hawaii could be preserved. This was an important victory for Japan, as newly established British or American bases would be a serious problem for the Japanese in the event of a future war. This provision of the treaty essentially guaranteed that Japan would be the dominant power in the Western Pacific and was essential for Japan to accept the borders for the construction of large Polish goods. [17] Together, the treaties signed at the Washington Naval Conference served to maintain the status quo in the Pacific: they recognized existing interests and made no fundamental changes. At the same time, the United States secured agreements that strengthened its existing policy in the Pacific, including the open door policy in China and the protection of the Philippines, while limiting as much as possible the extent of Japanese imperial expansion. After the First World War, the leaders of the international community tried to prevent the possibility of a new war. The rise of Japanese militarism and an international arms race have reinforced these concerns. As a result, policymakers have worked to reduce the growing threat. Senator William E. Borah (R-Idaho) led a congressional effort to demand that the United States involve its two main competitors in the naval arms race, Japan and the United Kingdom, in disarmament negotiations.

In short, the Agreement on the Limitation of the Navy does not limit future competition in the construction of submarines, desstructors, cruisers or other types of navy ships fighting in all numbers, with the exception of large combat ships and aircraft carriers. It practically does not reduce the current effective force of capital fleets in itself, but merely opposes their expansion; and includes specific provisions for the expansion of the current aircraft carrier workforce. Of a total of 1,645,810 tons to be destroyed, more than half are made up of ships almost all so old, so slow or relatively unarmed that they can no longer be considered combat-capable in a current combat fleet. In this context, it should be recalled that before 191o- and as a measure of naval efficiency pending a war on the part of Germany – Admiral Lord Fisher was wiping 16 ships of the British Navy “which could neither fight nor escape”. In addition, to the personal knowledge of the current writer, some United States naval authorities have been advocating for the elimination of 15 of the 17 American battleships to be scrapped in recent years; and this, not as a measure to reduce the power of the U.S. fleet, but as a means of increasing the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy by offloading it from virtually useless dead wood. . .

.